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Improved security in geographic ad hoc routing through autonomous position verification
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Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Vehicular ad hoc networks table of contents
Los Angeles, CA, USA
SESSION: Security table of contents
Pages: 57 - 66  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-540-1
Authors
Tim Leinmüller  DaimlerChrysler AG, Ulm, Germany
Christian Maihöfer  DaimlerChrysler AG, Ulm, Germany
Elmar Schoch  Ulm University, Ulm, Germany
Frank Kargl  Ulm University, Ulm, Germany
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGMOBILE: ACM Special Interest Group on Mobility of Systems, Users, Data and Computing
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Inter-vehicle communication is regarded as one of the major applications of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Compared to other MANETs, these so called vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have special requirements in terms of node mobility and position-dependent applications, which are well met by geographic routing protocols. Functional research on geographic routing has already reached a considerable level, whereas security aspects have been vastly neglected so far. Since position dissemination is crucial for geographic routing, forged position information has severe impact regarding both performance and security.In order to lessen this problem, we propose a detection mechanism that is capable of recognizing nodes cheating about their position in beacons (periodic position dissemination in most single-path geographic routing protocols, e.g. GPSR). Unlike other proposals described in the literature, our detection does not rely on additional hardware or special nodes, which contradicts the ad hoc approach. Instead, this mechanism uses a number of different independent sensors to quickly give an estimation of the trustworthiness of other nodes' position claims without using dedicated infrastructure or specialized hardware.The simulative evaluation proves that our position verification system successfully discloses nodes disseminating false positions and thereby widely prevents attacks using position cheating.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Tim Leinmüller: colleagues
Christian Maihöfer: colleagues
Elmar Schoch: colleagues
Frank Kargl: colleagues