Using tags to evolve trust and cooperation between groups

ABSTRACT

Tags [2] are externally visible markers that are determined by an individual's genes. We study a simple model of interactions between large groups of boundedly rational players playing the prisoner's dilemma [1], who are allowed to see one another's tags prior to choosing an action, but may not choose their opponent. Since tags are genetically determined, they are correlated with the behavior of the tagged individual, and possessing a similar tag implies similar behavior. Our tag model exploits this correlation so as to enable beneficial interactions between groups of players. Computer simulations show that with the tag mechanism in place, cooperation between different groups of players can become common.

REFERENCES

• 1: R. Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York, 1984.
• 2: David Hales , Bruce Edmonds, Evolving social rationality for MAS using "tags", Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems, July 14-18, 2003, Melbourne, Australia [doi>10.1145/860575.860655]

INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  I. Computing Methodologies
  I.2 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
        I.2.11 Distributed Artificial Intelligence
            Subjects: Multiagent systems

General Terms:
Experimentation

Keywords:
artificial social systems, evolution, multi-agent simulation & modeling, prisoner's dilemma, tags, trust and reputation