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Enterprise privacy promises and enforcement
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Source Annual Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages archive
Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Issues in the theory of security table of contents
Long Beach, California
Pages: 58 - 66  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-58113-980-2
Authors
Adam Barth  Stanford University
John C. Mitchell  Stanford University
Sponsor
SIGPLAN: ACM Special Interest Group on Programming Languages
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Several formal languages have been proposed to encode privacy policies, ranging from the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), intended for communicating privacy policies to consumers over the web, to the Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL), intended to enable policy enforcement within an enterprise. However, current technology does not allow an enterprise to determine whether its detailed, internal enforcement policy meets its published privacy promises. We present a data-centric, unified model for privacy, equipped with a modal logic for reasoning about permission inheritance across data hierarchies. We use this model to critique two privacy preference languages (APPEL and XPref), to justify P3P's policy summarization algorithm, and to connect privacy policy languages, such as EPAL. Specifically, we characterize when one policy enforces another and provide an algorithm for generating the most specific privacy promises, at a given level of detail, guaranteed by a more detailed enforcement policy.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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R. Pucella and V. Weissman. Reasoning about dynamic policies. In Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures (FOSSACS), 2004.
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M. Schunter, P. Ashley, S. Hada, G. Karjoth, C. Powers, and M. Schunter. Enterprise privacy authorization language (EPAL 1.1), 2003. http://www.zurich.ibm.com/security/enterprise-privacy/epal/Specification/.


Collaborative Colleagues:
Adam Barth: colleagues
John C. Mitchell: colleagues