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SPV: secure path vector routing for securing BGP
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Source Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication archive
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications table of contents
Portland, Oregon, USA
SESSION: Secure networks table of contents
Pages: 179 - 192  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISBN:1-58113-862-8
Also published in ...
Authors
Yih-Chun Hu  UC Berkeley
Adrian Perrig  Carnegie Mellon University
Marvin Sirbu  Carnegie Mellon University
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 10,   Downloads (12 Months): 91,   Citation Count: 24
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ABSTRACT

As our economy and critical infrastructure increasingly relies on the Internet, the insecurity of the underlying border gateway routing protocol (BGP) stands out as the Achilles heel. Recent misconfigurations and attacks have demonstrated the brittleness of BGP. Securing BGP has become a priority.In this paper, we focus on a viable deployment path to secure BGP. We analyze security requirements, and consider tradeoffs of mechanisms that achieve the requirements. In particular, we study how to secure BGP update messages against attacks. We design an efficient cryptographic mechanism that relies only on symmetric cryptographic primitives to guard an ASPATH from alteration, and propose the Secure Path Vector (SPV) protocol. In contrast to the previously proposed S-BGP protocol, SPV is around 22 times faster. With the current effort to secure BGP, we anticipate that SPV will contribute several alternative mechanisms to secure BGP, especially for the case of incremental deployments.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  24

Collaborative Colleagues:
Yih-Chun Hu: colleagues
Adrian Perrig: colleagues
Marvin Sirbu: colleagues