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A key recovery attack on the 802.11b wired equivalent privacy protocol (WEP)
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Source ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) archive
Volume 7 ,  Issue 2  (May 2004) table of contents
Pages: 319 - 332  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISSN:1094-9224
Authors
Adam Stubblefield  Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD
John Ioannidis  AT&T Labs--Research
Aviel D. Rubin  Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we present a practical key recovery attack on WEP, the link-layer security protocol for 802.11b wireless networks. The attack is based on a partial key exposure vulnerability in the RC4 stream cipher discovered by Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir. This paper describes how to apply this flaw to breaking WEP, our implementation of the attack, and optimizations that can be used to reduce the number of packets required for the attack. We conclude that the 802.11b WEP standard is completely insecure, and we provide recommendations on how this vulnerability could be mitigated and repaired.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  12

Collaborative Colleagues:
Adam Stubblefield: colleagues
John Ioannidis: colleagues
Aviel D. Rubin: colleagues