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ABSTRACT
We describe Just Fast Keying (JFK), a new key-exchange protocol, primarily designed for use in the IP security architecture. It is simple, efficient, and secure; we sketch a proof of the latter property. JFK also has a number of novel engineering parameters that permit a variety of tradeoffs, most notably the ability to balance the need for perfect forward secrecy against susceptibility to denial-of-service attacks.
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CITED BY 7
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J. Smith , J. M. González-Nieto , C. Boyd, Modelling denial of service attacks on JFK with Meadows's cost-based framework, Proceedings of the 2006 Australasian workshops on Grid computing and e-research, p.125-134, January 16-19, 2006, Hobart, Tasmania, Australia
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