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Just fast keying: Key agreement in a hostile internet
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Source ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) archive
Volume 7 ,  Issue 2  (May 2004) table of contents
Pages: 242 - 273  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISSN:1094-9224
Authors
William Aiello  AT&T Labs Research
Steven M. Bellovin  AT&T Labs Research
Matt Blaze  AT&T Labs Research
Ran Canetti  IBM T. J. Watson Research Center
John Ioannidis  AT&T Labs Research
Angelos D. Keromytis  Columbia University, New York, NY
Omer Reingold  AT&T Labs Research
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We describe Just Fast Keying (JFK), a new key-exchange protocol, primarily designed for use in the IP security architecture. It is simple, efficient, and secure; we sketch a proof of the latter property. JFK also has a number of novel engineering parameters that permit a variety of tradeoffs, most notably the ability to balance the need for perfect forward secrecy against susceptibility to denial-of-service attacks.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
William Aiello: colleagues
Steven M. Bellovin: colleagues
Matt Blaze: colleagues
Ran Canetti: colleagues
John Ioannidis: colleagues
Angelos D. Keromytis: colleagues
Omer Reingold: colleagues