Computational criticisms of the revelation principle

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Computational criticisms of the revelation principle

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Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents

New York, NY, USA

SESSION: Brief announcements table of contents

Pages: 262 - 263

Year of Publication: 2004

ISBN:1-58113-711-0

Authors

Vincent Conitzer	Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
Tuomas Sandholm	Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA

Sponsors

ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

Bibliometrics

Downloads (6 Weeks): 5, Downloads (12 Months): 28, Citation Count: 5

Additional Information:

references cited by index terms collaborative colleagues

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REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

	1	A. Blum, J. Jackson, T. Sandholm, and M. Zinkevich. Preference elicitation and query learning. In Conference on Learning Theory (COLT), Washington, D.C., 2003.
	2	Joan Feigenbaum , Scott Shenker, Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions, Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications, September 28-28, 2002, Atlanta, Georgia, USA [doi>10.1145/570810.570812]
	3	Anshul Kothar , David C. Parke , Subhash Sur, Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions, Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.166-175, June 09-12, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA [doi>10.1145/779928.779948]
	4	A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston, and J. R. Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, 1995.

CITED BY 5

	Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm, Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, May 17-20, 2004, New York, NY, USA
	Kate Larson , Tuomas Sandholm, Mechanism design and deliberative agents, Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems, July 25-29, 2005, The Netherlands
	Daniel M. Reeves , Bethany M. Soule , Tejaswi Kasturi, Yootopia!, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, v.6 n.2, p.1-26, January 2007
	David C. Parkes, Auction design with costly preference elicitation, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, v.44 n.3, p.269-302, July 2005
	Vincent Conitzer, Computational aspects of mechanism design, Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence, p.1642-1643, July 09-13, 2005, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania