Simple primal-dual auctions are not possible

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Simple primal-dual auctions are not possible

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Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents

New York, NY, USA

SESSION: Brief announcements table of contents

Pages: 250 - 251

Year of Publication: 2004

ISBN:1-58113-711-0

Author

Debasis Mishra

University of Wisconsin - Madison, Madison, WI

Sponsors

ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

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Downloads (6 Weeks): 4, Downloads (12 Months): 14, Citation Count: 0

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ABSTRACT

de Vries et al. [3] show that if valuation function of each buyer satisfies gross substitutes condition, then we can design primal-dual auctions that implement the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome. But they require prices in these auctions to be non-linear and non-anonymous. In this note, we show that such a requirement is necessary. This means, if valuation function of each buyer satisfies gross substitutes, then there does not exist a primal-dual auction which will always converge to the VCG outcome if prices in the auction are (i) linear and non-anonymous, OR (ii) non-linear and anonymous.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

	1	M. L. Ausubel and R. P. Milgrom. Ascending auctions with package bidding. Frontiers of Theoretical Economics, 1(1):1--42, 2002.
	2	E. Clarke. Multipart Pricing of Public Goods. Public Choice, 8:19--33, 1971.
	3	S. de Vries, J. Schummer, and R. Vohra. On ascending vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects. Working Paper, http://www.kellogg.nwu.edu/faculty/ schummer/ftp/research, 2003.
	4	T. Groves. Incentives in Teams. Econometrica, 41:617--631, 1973.
	5	F. Gul and E. Stacchetti. Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes. Journal of Economic Theory, 87(1):95--124, July 1999.
	6	F. Gul and E. Stacchetti. The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities. Journal of Economic Theory, 92(1):66--95, May 2000.
	7	D. Parkes and L. Ungar. An ascending-price generalized vickrey auction. Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE) Summer Workshop: The Economics of the Internet, June 2002. http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~parkes/publist.html.
	8	W. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. Journal of Finance, 16:8--37, 1961.