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Java bytecode verification for secure information flow
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Source ACM SIGPLAN Notices archive
Volume 38 ,  Issue 12  (December 2003) table of contents
COLUMN: Technical correspondence table of contents
Pages: 20 - 27  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISSN:0362-1340
Authors
Marco Avvenuti  Università di Pisa, Pisa, Italy
Cinzia Bernardeschi  Università di Pisa, Pisa, Italy
Nicoletta De Francesco  Università di Pisa, Pisa, Italy
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Security of Java programs is important as they can be executed in different platforms. This paper addresses the problem of secure information flow for Java bytecode. In information flow analysis one wishes to check if high security data can ever propagate to low security observers. We propose a static analysis similar to the type-level abstract interpretation used for standard bytecode verification. Instead of types, our technique works with secrecy levels assigned to classes, methods' parameters and returned values, and handles implicit information flows. A verification tool based on the proposed technique is under development. Using the tool, programs downloaded from untrusted hosts can be checked locally prior to executing them.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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C. Bernardeschi, N. D. Francesco, and G. Lettieri. An abstract semantics tool for secure information flow of stack-based assembly programs. Microprocessors and Microsystems, 26(8):391--398, 2002.
 
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M. Mizuno and D. A. Schmidt. A security flow control algorithm and its denotational semantics correctness proof. Formal Aspects of Computing, 4:727--754, 1992.
 
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E. Rose and K. Rose. Lightweight bytecode verification. In WFUJ 98 Proceedings, 1998.
 
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L. T. and F. Yellin. The Java virtual machine specification. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, Massachusetts, 1996.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Marco Avvenuti: colleagues
Cinzia Bernardeschi: colleagues
Nicoletta De Francesco: colleagues