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Automatic generation of two-party computations
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Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Washington D.C., USA
SESSION: Cryptographic protocols/ network security table of contents
Pages: 210 - 219  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-738-9
Authors
Philip MacKenzie  Bell Labs, Lucent Technologies, Murray Hill, NJ
Alina Oprea  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
Michael K. Reiter  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
Sponsor
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We present the design and implementation of a compiler that automatically generates protocols that perform two-party computations. The input to our protocol is the specification of a computation with secret inputs (e.g., a signature algorithm) expressed using operations in the field Zq of integers modulo a prime q and in the multiplicative subgroup of order q in Z*p for q|p-1 with generator g. The output of our compiler is an implementation of each party in a two-party protocol to perform the same computation securely, i.e., so that both parties can together compute the function but neither can alone. The protocols generated by our compiler are provably secure, in that their strength can be reduced to that of the original cryptographic computation via simulation arguments. Our compiler can be applied to various cryptographic primitives (e.g., signature schemes, encryption schemes, oblivious transfer protocols) and other protocols that employ a trusted party (e.g., key retrieval, key distribution).


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Philip MacKenzie: colleagues
Alina Oprea: colleagues
Michael K. Reiter: colleagues