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Monitoring and early warning for internet worms
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Washington D.C., USA
SESSION: Information warfare table of contents
Pages: 190 - 199  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-738-9
Authors
Cliff Changchun Zou  University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Lixin Gao  University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Weibo Gong  University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Don Towsley  University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Sponsor
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

After the Code Red incident in 2001 and the SQL Slammer in January 2003, it is clear that a simple self-propagating worm can quickly spread across the Internet, infects most vulnerable computers before people can take effective countermeasures. The fast spreading nature of worms calls for a worm monitoring and early warning system. In this paper, we propose effective algorithms for early detection of the presence of a worm and the corresponding monitoring system. Based on epidemic model and observation data from the monitoring system, by using the idea of "detecting the trend, not the rate" of monitored illegitimated scan traffic, we propose to use a Kalman filter to detect a worm's propagation at its early stage in real-time. In addition, we can effectively predict the overall vulnerable population size, and correct the bias in the observed number of infected hosts. Our simulation experiments for Code Red and SQL Slammer show that with observation data from a small fraction of IP addresses, we can detect the presence of a worm when it infects only 1% to 2% of the vulnerable computers on the Internet.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  50

Collaborative Colleagues:
Cliff Changchun Zou: colleagues
Lixin Gao: colleagues
Weibo Gong: colleagues
Don Towsley: colleagues