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Receiver anonymity via incomparable public keys
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Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Washington D.C., USA
SESSION: Privacy/anonymity table of contents
Pages: 112 - 121  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-738-9
Authors
Brent R. Waters  Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
Edward W. Felten  Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
Amit Sahai  Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
Sponsor
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We describe a new method for protecting the anonymity of message receivers in an untrusted network. Surprisingly, existing methods fail to provide the required level of anonymity for receivers (although those methods do protect sender anonymity). Our method relies on the use of multicast, along with a novel cryptographic primitive that we call an Incomparable Public Key cryptosystem, which allows a receiver to efficiently create many anonymous "identities" for itself without divulging that these separate "identities" actually refer to the same receiver, and without increasing the receiver's workload as the number of identities increases. We describe the details of our method, along with a prototype implementation.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Philippe Golle, Markus Jakobsson, Ari Juels, and Paul Syverson. Universal Re-encryption for Mixnets, 2003. http://crypto.stanford.edu/~pgolle/papers/univrenc.html.
 
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The GNU Privacy Guard. http://www.gnupg.org.


Collaborative Colleagues:
Brent R. Waters: colleagues
Edward W. Felten: colleagues
Amit Sahai: colleagues