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LEAP: efficient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Washington D.C., USA
SESSION: Sensor networks table of contents
Pages: 62 - 72  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-738-9
Authors
Sencun Zhu  George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Sanjeev Setia  George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Sushil Jajodia  George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Sponsor
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we describe LEAP (Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol), a key management protocol for sensor networks that is designed to support in-network processing, while at the same time restricting the security impact of a node compromise to the immediate network neighborhood of the compromised node. The design of the protocol is motivated by the observation that different types of messages exchanged between sensor nodes have different security requirements, and that a single keying mechanism is not suitable for meeting these different security requirements. LEAP supports the establishment of four types of keys for each sensor node -- an individual key shared with the base station, a pairwise key shared with another sensor node, a cluster key shared with multiple neighboring nodes, and a group key that is shared by all the nodes in the network. The protocol used for establishing and updating these keys is communication- and energy-efficient, and minimizes the involvement of the base station. LEAP also includes an efficient protocol for inter-node traffic authentication based on the use of one-way key chains. A salient feature of the authentication protocol is that it supports source authentication without precluding in-network processing and passive participation. We analyze the performance and the security of our scheme under various attack models and show our schemes are very efficient in defending against many attacks.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  98

Collaborative Colleagues:
Sencun Zhu: colleagues
Sanjeev Setia: colleagues
Sushil Jajodia: colleagues