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Separating agreement from execution for byzantine fault tolerant services
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Source ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles archive
Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles table of contents
Bolton Landing, NY, USA
SESSION: Revising old friends table of contents
Pages: 253 - 267  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-757-5
Also published in ...
Authors
Jian Yin  The University of Texas at Austin, TX
Jean-Philippe Martin  The University of Texas at Austin, TX
Arun Venkataramani  The University of Texas at Austin, TX
Lorenzo Alvisi  The University of Texas at Austin, TX
Mike Dahlin  The University of Texas at Austin, TX
Sponsors
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We describe a new architecture for Byzantine fault tolerant state machine replication that separates agreement that orders requests from execution that processes requests. This separation yields two fundamental and practically significant advantages over previous architectures. First, it reduces replication costs because the new architecture can tolerate faults in up to half of the state machine replicas that execute requests. Previous systems can tolerate faults in at most a third of the combined agreement/state machine replicas. Second, separating agreement from execution allows a general privacy firewall architecture to protect confidentiality through replication. In contrast, replication in previous systems hurts confidentiality because exploiting the weakest replica can be sufficient to compromise the system. We have constructed a prototype and evaluated it running both microbenchmarks and an NFS server. Overall, we find that the architecture adds modest latencies to unreplicated systems and that its performance is competitive with existing Byzantine fault tolerant systems.


REFERENCES

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J. Yin, J-P. Martin, A. Venkataramani, M. Dahlin, and L. Alvisi. Separating agreement from execution for byzantine fault tolerant services. Technical report, University of Texas at Austin, Department of Computer Sciences, August 2003.
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CITED BY  22

Collaborative Colleagues:
Jian Yin: colleagues
Jean-Philippe Martin: colleagues
Arun Venkataramani: colleagues
Lorenzo Alvisi: colleagues
Mike Dahlin: colleagues