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Backtracking intrusions
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Source ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles archive
Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles table of contents
Bolton Landing, NY, USA
SESSION: Making operating systems more robust table of contents
Pages: 223 - 236  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-757-5
Also published in ...
Authors
Samuel T. King  University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
Peter M. Chen  University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
Sponsors
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 28,   Downloads (12 Months): 153,   Citation Count: 37
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ABSTRACT

Analyzing intrusions today is an arduous, largely manual task because system administrators lack the information and tools needed to understand easily the sequence of steps that occurred in an attack. The goal of BackTracker is to identify automatically potential sequences of steps that occurred in an intrusion. Starting with a single detection point (e.g., a suspicious file), BackTracker identifies files and processes that could have affected that detection point and displays chains of events in a dependency graph. We use BackTracker to analyze several real attacks against computers that we set up as honeypots. In each case, BackTracker is able to highlight effectively the entry point used to gain access to the system and the sequence of steps from that entry point to the point at which we noticed the intrusion. The logging required to support BackTracker added 9% overhead in running time and generated 1.2 GB per day of log data for an operating-system intensive workload.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  37

Collaborative Colleagues:
Samuel T. King: colleagues
Peter M. Chen: colleagues