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Terra: a virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing
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Source ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles archive
Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles table of contents
Bolton Landing, NY, USA
SESSION: Virtual machine monitors table of contents
Pages: 193 - 206  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-757-5
Also published in ...
Authors
Tal Garfinkel  Stanford University
Ben Pfaff  Stanford University
Jim Chow  Stanford University
Mendel Rosenblum  Stanford University
Dan Boneh  Stanford University
Sponsors
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We present a flexible architecture for trusted computing, called Terra, that allows applications with a wide range of security requirements to run simultaneously on commodity hardware. Applications on Terra enjoy the semantics of running on a separate, dedicated, tamper-resistant hardware platform, while retaining the ability to run side-by-side with normal applications on a general-purpose computing platform. Terra achieves this synthesis by use of a trusted virtual machine monitor (TVMM) that partitions a tamper-resistant hardware platform into multiple, isolated virtual machines (VM), providing the appearance of multiple boxes on a single, general-purpose platform. To each VM, the TVMM provides the semantics of either an "open box," i.e. a general-purpose hardware platform like today's PCs and workstations, or a "closed box," an opaque special-purpose platform that protects the privacy and integrity of its contents like today's game consoles and cellular phones. The software stack in each VM can be tailored from the hardware interface up to meet the security requirements of its application(s). The hardware and TVMM can act as a trusted party to allow closed-box VMs to cryptographically identify the software they run, i.e. what is in the box, to remote parties. We explore the strengths and limitations of this architecture by describing our prototype implementation and several applications that we developed for it.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  86

Collaborative Colleagues:
Tal Garfinkel: colleagues
Ben Pfaff: colleagues
Jim Chow: colleagues
Mendel Rosenblum: colleagues
Dan Boneh: colleagues