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OCB: A block-cipher mode of operation for efficient authenticated encryption
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Source ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) archive
Volume 6 ,  Issue 3  (August 2003) table of contents
Pages: 365 - 403  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISSN:1094-9224
Authors
Phillip Rogaway  University of California at Davis and Chiang Mai University, Davis, CA
Mihir Bellare  University of California at San Diego, La Jolla, CA
John Black  University of Colorado at Boulder
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We describe a parallelizable block-cipher mode of operation that simultaneously provides privacy and authenticity. OCB encrypts-and-authenticates a nonempty string M ∈ {0, 1}* using ⌈&vertbar;M&vertbar;/n⌉ + 2 block-cipher invocations, where n is the block length of the underlying block cipher. Additional overhead is small. OCB refines a scheme, IAPM, suggested by Charanjit Jutla. Desirable properties of OCB include the ability to encrypt a bit string of arbitrary length into a ciphertext of minimal length, cheap offset calculations, cheap key setup, a single underlying cryptographic key, no extended-precision addition, a nearly optimal number of block-cipher calls, and no requirement for a random IV. We prove OCB secure, quantifying the adversary's ability to violate the mode's privacy or authenticity in terms of the quality of its block cipher as a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) or as a strong PRP, respectively.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  9

Collaborative Colleagues:
Phillip Rogaway: colleagues
Mihir Bellare: colleagues
John Black: colleagues