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A framework for classifying denial of service attacks
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Source Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication archive
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications table of contents
Karlsruhe, Germany
SESSION: Denial-of-service table of contents
Pages: 99 - 110  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-735-4
Authors
Alefiya Hussain  USC/Information Sciences Institute
John Heidemann  USC/Information Sciences Institute
Christos Papadopoulos  USC/Information Sciences Institute
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 47,   Downloads (12 Months): 341,   Citation Count: 48
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ABSTRACT

Launching a denial of service (DoS) attack is trivial, but detection and response is a painfully slow and often a manual process. Automatic classification of attacks as single- or multi-source can help focus a response, but current packet-header-based approaches are susceptible to spoofing. This paper introduces a framework for classifying DoS attacks based on header content, and novel techniques such as transient ramp-up behavior and spectral analysis. Although headers are easily forged, we show that characteristics of attack ramp-up and attack spectrum are more difficult to spoof. To evaluate our framework we monitored access links of a regional ISP detecting 80 live attacks. Header analysis identified the number of attackers in 67 attacks, while the remaining 13 attacks were classified based on ramp-up and spectral analysis. We validate our results through monitoring at a second site, controlled experiments, and simulation. We use experiments and simulation to understand the underlying reasons for the characteristics observed. In addition to helping understand attack dynamics, classification mechanisms such as ours are important for the development of realistic models of DoS traffic, can be packaged as an automated tool to aid in rapid response to attacks, and can also be used to estimate the level of DoS activity on the Internet.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  48

Collaborative Colleagues:
Alefiya Hussain: colleagues
John Heidemann: colleagues
Christos Papadopoulos: colleagues