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Using computer algebra to find nash equilibria
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Source International Conference on Symbolic and Algebraic Computation archive
Proceedings of the 2003 international symposium on Symbolic and algebraic computation table of contents
Philadelphia, PA, USA
Pages: 74 - 79  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-641-2
Author
Ruchira S. Datta  University of California, Berkeley, California
Sponsors
SIGSAM: ACM Special Interest Group on Symbolic and Algebraic Manipulation
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

A central concern of game theory is the computation of Nash equilibria. These are characterized by systems of polynomial equations and inequalities. We survey the use of currently available software to solve these systems, and conclude that polyhedral homotopy continuation appears to scale best with increasing problem size.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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