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ReVirt: enabling intrusion analysis through virtual-machine logging and replay
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Source ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review archive
Volume 36 ,  Issue SI  (Winter 2002) table of contents
OSDI '02: Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementation
SPECIAL ISSUE: Virtual machines table of contents
Pages: 211 - 224  
Year of Publication: 2002
ISSN:0163-5980
Authors
George W. Dunlap  University of Michigan
Samuel T. King  University of Michigan
Sukru Cinar  University of Michigan
Murtaza A. Basrai  University of Michigan
Peter M. Chen  University of Michigan
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Current system loggers have two problems: they depend on the integrity of the operating system being logged, and they do not save sufficient information to replay and analyze attacks that include any non-deterministic events. ReVirt removes the dependency on the target operating system by moving it into a virtual machine and logging below the virtual machine. This allows ReVirt to replay the system's execution before, during, and after an intruder compromises the system, even if the intruder replaces the target operating system. ReVirt logs enough information to replay a long-term execution of the virtual machine instruction-by-instruction. This enables it to provide arbitrarily detailed observations about what transpired on the system, even in the presence of non-deterministic attacks and executions. ReVirt adds reasonable time and space overhead. Overheads due to virtualization are imperceptible for interactive use and CPU-bound workloads, and 13--58% for kernel-intensive workloads. Logging adds 0--8% overhead, and logging traffic for our workloads can be stored on a single disk for several months.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  16

Collaborative Colleagues:
George W. Dunlap: colleagues
Samuel T. King: colleagues
Sukru Cinar: colleagues
Murtaza A. Basrai: colleagues
Peter M. Chen: colleagues