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ABSTRACT
The ability to “hide” one bit in trapdoor functions has recently gained much interest in cryptography research, and is of great importance in many transactions protocols. In this paper we study the cryptographic security of RSA bits. In particular, we show that unless the cryptanalyst can completely break the RSA encryption, any heuristic he uses to determine the least significant bit of the cleartext must have an error probability greater than 1&edivide;4—&egr; A similar result is shown for Rabin's encryption scheme.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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Blum, M. and S. Micali, "How to Generate Cryptographically Strong Sequences of Pseudo Random Bits", Proceedings of the 23rd FOCS, 1982.
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Yao, A., "Theory and Applications of Trapdoor Functions," Proceedings of the 23rd FOCS, 1982.
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