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A nonparametric estimator for setting: reserve prices in procurement auctions
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Source Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents
San Diego, CA, USA
POSTER SESSION: Poster paper sessions table of contents
Pages: 254 - 255  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-679-X
Authors
M. Bichler  IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY
J. R. Kalagnanam  IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 5,   Downloads (12 Months): 18,   Citation Count: 1
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ABSTRACT

Electronic auction markets collect large amounts of auction field data. This enables a structural estimation of the bid distributions and the possibility to derive optimal reserve prices. In this paper we propose a new approach to setting reserve prices. In contrast to traditional auction theory we use the buyer's risk statement for getting a winning bid as a key criterion to set an optimal reserve price. The reserve price for a given probability can then be derived from the distribution function of the observed drop-out bids. In order to get an accurate model of this function, we propose a nonparametric technique based on kernel distribution function estimators and the use of order statistics. We improve our estimatior by additional information, which can be observed about bidders and qualitative differences of goods in past auctions rounds (e.g. different delivery times). This makes the technique applicable to RFQs and multi-attribute auctions, with qualitatively differentiated offers.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
E. Wolfstetter, "Auctions: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 10, pp. 367--420, 1996.
 
2
J. G. Riley and J. G. Samuleson, "Optimal auctions," American Economic Review, vol. 71, pp. 381--392, 1981.
 
3
R. B. Myerson, "Optimal auction design," Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 6, pp. 58--73, 1981.
 
4
 
5
R. P. McAfee and D. Vincent, "Updating the Reserve Price in Common-Value Auctions," American Economic Review, vol. 82, pp. 512--518, 1992.
 
6
E. Parzen, "On estimation of a probability density function and mode," Ann. Math Statist., vol. 33, pp. 1065--1076, 1962.
 
7
M. Rosenblatt, "Remarks on some non-parametric estimates of a density function," Ann. Math.Statist., vol. 27, pp. 832--837, 1956.
 
8
J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole, "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, vol. 59, pp. 1735--1754, 1988.


Collaborative Colleagues:
M. Bichler: colleagues
J. R. Kalagnanam: colleagues