Coalitional games on graphs

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Coalitional games on graphs: core structure, substitutes and frugality

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Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents

San Diego, CA, USA

POSTER SESSION: Poster paper sessions table of contents

Pages: 248 - 249

Year of Publication: 2003

ISBN:1-58113-679-X

Authors

Rahul Garg	IBM India Research Lab, New Delhi, India
Vijay Kumar	Amazon.com, Seattle, WA
Atri Rudra	University of Texas at Austin, TX
Akshat Verma	IBM India Research Lab, New Delhi, India

Sponsors

ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

Bibliometrics

Downloads (6 Weeks): 2, Downloads (12 Months): 31, Citation Count: 3

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references cited by index terms collaborative colleagues

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REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

	1	Aaron Archer , Éva Tardos, Frugal path mechanisms, Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, p.991-999, January 06-08, 2002, San Francisco, California
	2	S. Bikhchandani and J.M.Ostroy, "The Package Assignment Model". Unpublished manuscript, 2001.
	3	S. Bikhchandani, S.E. Vries, J. Schummer and R.V. Vohra, "Linear Programming and Vickery Auction". Unpublished manuscript, 2001.
	4	E.H. Clarke "Multipart pricing of public goods", in Public Choice, pages 17--33, 1971.
	5	R. Garg, V. Kumar, A. Rudra and A. Verma, "Coalitional games on graphs: core structures, substitutes and frugality". UTCS Technical Report TR-02-60, November 2002.
	6	T. Groves, "Incentives in teams", in Econometrica, pages 617--631, 1973.
	7	M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A course in Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1994.
	8	Kunal Talwar, The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms, Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, p.608-619, February 27-March 01, 2003
	9	W. Vickrey, "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders", in Journal of Finance, Vol-16, Pages 8--37, 1961.

CITED BY 3

	Luzi Anderegg , Stephan Eidenbenz, Ad hoc-VCG: a truthful and cost-efficient routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks with selfish agents, Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking, September 14-19, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA
	Nicole Immorlica , David Karger , Evdokia Nikolova , Rahul Sami, First-price path auctions, Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.203-212, June 05-08, 2005, Vancouver, BC, Canada
	Edith Elkind , Leslie Ann Goldberg , Paul W. Goldberg, Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover, Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, June 11-15, 2007, San Diego, California, USA