Pricing WiFi at Starbucks

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Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: issues in online mechanism design

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Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents

San Diego, CA, USA

POSTER SESSION: Poster paper sessions table of contents

Pages: 240 - 241

Year of Publication: 2003

ISBN:1-58113-679-X

Authors

Eric J. Friedman	Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
David C. Parkes	Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

Sponsors

ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

Bibliometrics

Downloads (6 Weeks): 24, Downloads (12 Months): 117, Citation Count: 12

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abstract references cited by index terms collaborative colleagues

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ABSTRACT

We consider the problem of designing mechanisms for online problems in which agents arrive over time and truthfully announce their arrival. These problems are becoming extremely common in a wide variety of problems involving wireless networking and webserving. We show how the standard results of mechanism design can be modified to apply to this setting, provide conditions under which efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms exist and analyze several important online models including wireless networks and web serving.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

	1	A. Archer , É. Tardos, Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents, Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, p.482, October 14-17, 2001
	2	Joan Feigenbaum , Christos H. Papadimitriou , Scott Shenker, Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions, Journal of Computer and System Sciences, v.63 n.1, p.21-41, August 2001 [doi>10.1006/jcss.2001.1754]
	3	Eric Friedman and David C. Parkes. Pricing WiFi at Starbucks -- Issues in online mechanism design. http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/ parkes/pubs/online.pdf, 2002.
	4	Jeremie Gallien. Dynamic mechanism design for online commerce. Technical report, Sloan School of Management, MIT, Cambridge, 2002.
	5	Theodore Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41:617--631, 1973.
	6	Ron Lavi , Noam Nisan, Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions, Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.233-241, October 17-20, 2000, Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States [doi>10.1145/352871.352897]
	7	Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Economic Behavior, 35:166--196, 2001.

CITED BY 12

	Chaki Ng , David C. Parkes , Margo Seltzer, Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation, Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, June 09-12, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA
	Ryan Porter, Mechanism design for online real-time scheduling, Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, May 17-20, 2004, New York, NY, USA
	Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi , Robert Kleinberg , David C. Parkes, Adaptive limited-supply online auctions, Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, May 17-20, 2004, New York, NY, USA
	Ron Lavi , Noam Nisan, Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items, Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, January 23-25, 2005, Vancouver, British Columbia
	Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi, Online auctions with re-usable goods, Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.165-174, June 05-08, 2005, Vancouver, BC, Canada
	Richard T. B. Ma , Sam C. M. Lee , John C. S. Lui , David K. Y. Yau, Incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks: a game theoretic approach, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON), v.14 n.5, p.978-991, October 2006
	Eric J. Friedman , Joseph Y. Halpern , Ian Kash, Efficiency and nash equilibria in a scrip system for P2P networks, Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.140-149, June 11-15, 2006, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
	Mingyu Guo , Vincent Conitzer, Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments, Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, June 11-15, 2007, San Diego, California, USA
	Ray K. Lam , Dah-Ming Chiu , John C. S. Lui, On the Access Pricing and Network Scaling Issues of Wireless Mesh Networks, IEEE Transactions on Computers, v.56 n.11, p.1456-1469, November 2007
	Davide Bilò , Luciano Gualà , Guido Proietti, Dynamic mechanism design, Theoretical Computer Science, v.410 n.17, p.1564-1572, April, 2009
	Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi , Robert Kleinberg , Tuomas Sandholm, Automated online mechanism design and prophet inequalities, Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence, p.58-65, July 22-26, 2007, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
	L. Amar , A. Mu'alem , J. Stosser, On the importance of migration for fairness in online grid markets, Proceedings of the 2008 9th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Grid Computing, p.65-74, September 29-October 01, 2008