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Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation

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Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents

San Diego, CA, USA

POSTER SESSION: Poster paper sessions table of contents

Pages: 238 - 239

Year of Publication: 2003

ISBN:1-58113-679-X

Authors

Chaki Ng	Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
David C. Parkes	Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
Margo Seltzer	Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

Sponsors

ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

Bibliometrics

Downloads (6 Weeks): 5, Downloads (12 Months): 27, Citation Count: 6

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ABSTRACT

We consider the problem of designing fast and strategyproof exchanges for dynamic resource allocation problems in distributed systems. The exchange is implemented as a sequence of auctions, with dynamically arriving requests from agents matched with each auction. Each auction is associated with some consignment of the resources from a single seller. We provide a simple Virtual Worlds (VW) construction, that extends a fast and strategyproof mechanism for a single auction to apply to this sequence-of-auctions setting. Rather than match each buyer with a single auction, the VW mechanism allows buyers to be considered for multiple auctions while retaining strategyproofness.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

	1	Eric J. Friedman , David C. Parkes, Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: issues in online mechanism design, Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, June 09-12, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA [doi>10.1145/779928.779978]
	2	Daniel Lehmann , Liadan Ita Oćallaghan , Yoav Shoham, Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions, Journal of the ACM (JACM), v.49 n.5, p.577-602, September 2002 [doi>10.1145/585265.585266]
	3	C. Ng, D. C. Parkes, and M. Seltzer. Strategyproof Computing: Systems Infrastructures for Self-Interested Parties. Technical report, Harvard University, 2003.
	4	Chaki Ng , David C. Parkes , Margo Seltzer, Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation, Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, June 09-12, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA [doi>10.1145/779928.779977]

CITED BY 6

	Chaki Ng , David C. Parkes , Margo Seltzer, Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation, Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, June 09-12, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA
	Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi, Online auctions with re-usable goods, Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.165-174, June 05-08, 2005, Vancouver, BC, Canada
	Chaki Ng , Philip Buonadonna , Brent N. Chun , Alex C. Snoeren , Amin Vahdat, Addressing strategic behavior in a deployed microeconomic resource allocator, Proceeding of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems, August 22-22, 2005, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
	Elisabeth Crawford , Manuela Veloso, Mechanism design for multi-agent meeting scheduling, Web Intelligence and Agent System, v.4 n.2, p.209-220, April 2006
	Adam I. Juda , David C. Parkes, An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem, Artificial Intelligence, v.173 n.7-8, p.876-899, May, 2009
	Ravi Bapna , Paulo Goes , Alok Gupta, Auctioning Vertically Integrated Online Services: Computational Approaches for Real-Time Allocation, Journal of Management Information Systems, v.25 n.3, p.65-98, Number 3 / Winter 2008-9