Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions

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Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions

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Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents

San Diego, CA, USA

POSTER SESSION: Poster paper sessions table of contents

Pages: 214 - 215

Year of Publication: 2003

ISBN:1-58113-679-X

Authors

Aditya V. Sunderam	Harvard College, Cambridge, MA
David C. Parkes	Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

Sponsors

ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

Bibliometrics

Downloads (6 Weeks): 5, Downloads (12 Months): 26, Citation Count: 8

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abstract references cited by index terms collaborative colleagues

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ABSTRACT

We consider the problem of minimizing preference elicitation in efficient multiattribute auctions, that support dynamic negotiation over non-price based attributes such as quality, time-of-delivery, and processor speed. We introduce asynchronous price-based multiattribute auctions, with proxy bidding agents that sit between the auctioneer and the participants. Empirical results demonstrate the preference elicitation savings that are provided with minimal price spaces, asynchronous updates, and proxy agents.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

	1	Y. K. Che. Design competition through multidimensional auctions. RAND Journal of Economics, 24:668--680, 1993.
	2	Wolfram Conen , Tuomas Sandholm, Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, p.256-259, October 14-17, 2001, Tampa, Florida, USA [doi>10.1145/501158.501191]
	3	R. L. Keeney and H. Raiffa. Decision Making with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs. CUP, 1993.
	4	D. C. Parkes. Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation problems. In Proc. IJCAI-99 Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce, pages 206--219, July 1999. Stockholm.
	5	David C. Parkes, Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions, Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems, p.103-122, July 16, 2002
	6	D. C. Parkes and J. Kalagnanam. Iterative Multiattribute Vickrey Auctions. Submitted for publication, 2002.
	7	David C. Parkes , Lyle H. Ungar, Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment, Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, p.82-89, July 30-August 03, 2000
	8	Aditya V. Sunderam , David C. Parkes, Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions, Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, June 09-12, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA [doi>10.1145/779928.779965]

CITED BY 8

	Aditya V. Sunderam , David C. Parkes, Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions, Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, June 09-12, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA
	Yagil Engel , Michael P. Wellman , Kevin M. Lochner, Bid expressiveness and clearing algorithms in multiattribute double auctions, Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.110-119, June 11-15, 2006, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
	Esther David , Rina Azoulay-Schwartz , Sarit Kraus, Bidding in sealed-bid and English multi-attribute auctions, Decision Support Systems, v.42 n.2, p.527-556, November 2006
	David C. Parkes , Jayant Kalagnanam, Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions, Management Science, v.51 n.3, p.435-451, March 2005
	David C. Parkes, Auction design with costly preference elicitation, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, v.44 n.3, p.269-302, July 2005
	David E. Wilkins , Stephen F. Smith , Laurence A. Kramer , Thomas J. Lee , Timothy W. Rauenbusch, Airlift mission monitoring and dynamic rescheduling, Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, v.21 n.2, p.141-155, March, 2008
	Craig Boutilier , Tuomas Sandholm , Rob Shields, Eliciting bid taker non-price preferences in (combinatorial) auctions, Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence, p.204-211, July 25-29, 2004, San Jose, California
	Gal Bahar , Moshe Tennenholtz, Sequential-simultaneous information elicitation in multi-agent systems, Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence, p.923-928, July 30-August 05, 2005, Edinburgh, Scotland