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Profit guaranteeing mechanisms for multicast networks
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Source Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents
San Diego, CA, USA
POSTER SESSION: Poster paper sessions table of contents
Pages: 190 - 191  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-679-X
Authors
S. Chawla  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
D. Kitchin  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
U. Rajan  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
R. Ravi  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
A. Sinha  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 1,   Downloads (12 Months): 9,   Citation Count: 1
Additional Information:

references   cited by   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

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REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
S. Bikhchandani, S. de Vries, J. Schummer, and R. Vohra. Linear programming an Vickrey auctions. Mathematics of the Internet: E-auction and Markets, IMA Volume on Mathematics and its Applications 127:75--116, 2002.
 
2
S. Chawla, D. Kitchin, U. Rajan, R. Ravi, and A. Sinha. Profit maximizing mechanisms for the extended multicasting game. CMU CS Technical report CMU-CS-02-164, 2002.
 
3
Joan Feigenbaum , Arvind Krishnamurthy , Rahul Sami , Scott Shenker, Hardness Results for Multicast Cost Sharing, Proceedings of the 22nd Conference Kanpur on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science, p.133-144, December 12-14, 2002
 
4
Joan Feigenbaum , Christos H. Papadimitriou , Scott Shenker, Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions, Journal of Computer and System Sciences, v.63 n.1, p.21-41, August 2001  [doi>10.1006/jcss.2001.1754]
5
Amos Fiat , Andrew V. Goldberg , Jason D. Hartline , Anna R. Karlin, Competitive generalized auctions, Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, May 19-21, 2002, Montreal, Quebec, Canada  [doi>10.1145/509907.509921]
 
6
Michel X. Goemans , David P. Williamson, A General Approximation Technique for Constrained Forest Problems, SIAM Journal on Computing, v.24 n.2, p.296-317, April 1995  [doi>10.1137/S0097539793242618]
 
7
H. Moulin and S. Shenker. Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance vs efficiency. Economic Theory

CITED BY
Patrik Österberg , Tingting Zhang, Bid-based cost sharing among multicast receivers, The Fourth International Conference on Heterogeneous Networking for Quality, Reliability, Security and Robustness & Workshops, August 14-17, 2007, Vancouver, Canada

INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  F. Theory of Computation
  F.2 ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHMS AND PROBLEM COMPLEXITY
      F.2.0 General


General Terms:
Algorithms, Theory


Keywords:
mechanism design, multicast game, profit maximization

Collaborative Colleagues:
S. Chawla: colleagues
D. Kitchin: colleagues
U. Rajan: colleagues
R. Ravi: colleagues
A. Sinha: colleagues

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