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Specifying and enforcing constraints in role-based access control
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Source Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies archive
Proceedings of the eighth ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies table of contents
Como, Italy
SESSION: Constraints table of contents
Pages: 43 - 50  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-681-1
Author
Jason Crampton  University of London, Egham, United Kingdom
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 14,   Downloads (12 Months): 85,   Citation Count: 17
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ABSTRACT

Constraints in access control in general and separation of duty constraints in particular are an important area of research. There are two important issues relating to constraints: their specification and their enforcement. We believe that existing separation of duty specification schemes are rather complicated and that the few enforcement models that exist are unlikely to scale well.We examine the assumptions behind existing approaches to separation of duty and present a combined specification and implementation model for a class of constraints that includes separation of duty constraints. The specification model is set-based and has a simpler syntax than existing approaches. We discuss the enforcement of constraints and the relationship between static, dynamic and historical separation of duty constraints. Finally, we propose a model for a scalable role-based reference monitor, based on dynamic access control structures, that can be used to enforce constraints in an efficient manner.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  17