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Software safety: why, what, and how
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Source ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) archive
Volume 18 ,  Issue 2  (June 1986) table of contents
Pages: 125 - 163  
Year of Publication: 1986
ISSN:0360-0300
Author
Nancy G. Leveson  Univ. of California, Irvine
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Software safety issues become important when computers are used to control real-time, safety-critical processes. This survey attempts to explain why there is a problem, what the problem is, and what is known about how to solve it. Since this is a relatively new software research area, emphasis is placed on delineating the outstanding issues and research topics.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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