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Representing and reusing explanations of legal precedents
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Source International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law archive
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Artificial intelligence and law table of contents
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
Pages: 103 - 110  
Year of Publication: 1989
ISBN:0-89791-322-1
Author
L. K. Branting  Department of Computer Sciences, University of Texas, Austin, TX
Sponsor
SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 2,   Downloads (12 Months): 9,   Citation Count: 9
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ABSTRACT

Precedent-based legal reasoning depends on accurate assessment of relevant similarities between new cases and existing precedents. Determining the relevant similarities between a new case and a precedent with respect to a legal category requires knowing the explanation of the precedent's membership in the category. GREBE is a system that uses both general legal rules and specific explanations of precedents to evaluate legal predicates in new cases. GREBE assesses the similarity of a new case to a precedent of a legal category by attempting to find a pattern of relations in the new case that corresponds to the facts of the precedent responsible for its category membership. Missing relations in the new case are inferred by reusing other explanations from past cases.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  9