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Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority
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Source Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing archive
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing table of contents
Seattle, Washington, United States
Pages: 73 - 85  
Year of Publication: 1989
ISBN:0-89791-307-8
Authors
T. Rabin  Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
M. Ben-Or  Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
Sponsor
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 26,   Downloads (12 Months): 204,   Citation Count: 66
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ABSTRACT

Under the assumption that each participant can broadcast a message to all other participants and that each pair of participants can communicate secretly, we present a verifiable secret sharing protocol, and show that any multiparty protocol, or game with incomplete information, can be achieved if a majority of the players are honest. The secrecy achieved is unconditional and does not rely on any assumption about computational intractability. Applications of these results to Byzantine Agreement are also presented. Underlying our results is a new tool of Information Checking which provides authentication without cryptographic assumptions and may have wide applications elsewhere.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
B
M. Ben-Or, Multiparty Protocols with Honest Majority, in preparation.
BGW
CCD
 
CGMA
B. Chor, S. Goldwasser, S. Micali and B. Awerbuch, Verifiable Secret Sharing and Achieving Simultaneity in the Presence of Faults, FOCS85, pp. 383-395
 
D
D. Dolev, The Byzantine Generals Strike Again, J. of Algorithms, Vol. 3, pp. 14-30, 1980.
 
DDY
D. Dolev, C. Dwork, M. Yung, NonCryptographic Secure Communication in General Networks. Preprint.
 
F
P. Feldman, Optimal Algorithms for Byzantine Agreement, MIT Ph.D. Thesis, to appear.
FM
GMW
 
R1
M. Rabin, Randomized Byzantine Generals, FOCS83, pp. 403-409
 
R2
M. Rabin, Digitalized Signatures, Foundations of Secure Computations, R. Demillo et.al, editors, Academic Press, (1978), pp. 155-165
 
RT
T. Rabin, Robust Sharing of Secrets when the Dealer is Honest or Cheating, M.Sc. Thesis, The Hebrew University, July 1988.
S
 
TW
M. Tompa and H. Woll, How to Share a Secret with Cheaters, IBM Research Report, RC 11840 (Log :#: 52910) (1986)

CITED BY  66