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SOS: secure overlay services
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Source Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication archive
Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications table of contents
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
SESSION: Overlay networks table of contents
Pages: 61 - 72  
Year of Publication: 2002
ISBN:1-58113-570-X
Also published in ...
Authors
Angelos D. Keromytis  Columbia University, New York, NY
Vishal Misra  Columbia University, New York, NY
Dan Rubenstein  Columbia University, New York, NY
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 10,   Downloads (12 Months): 102,   Citation Count: 71
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ABSTRACT

Denial of service (DoS) attacks continue to threaten the reliability of networking systems. Previous approaches for protecting networks from DoS attacks are reactive in that they wait for an attack to be launched before taking appropriate measures to protect the network. This leaves the door open for other attacks that use more sophisticated methods to mask their traffic.We propose an architecture called Secure Overlay Services (SOS) that proactively prevents DoS attacks, geared toward supporting Emergency Services or similar types of communication. The architecture is constructed using a combination of secure overlay tunneling, routing via consistent hashing, and filtering. We reduce the probability of successful attacks by (i) performing intensive filtering near protected network edges, pushing the attack point perimeter into the core of the network, where high-speed routers can handle the volume of attack traffic, and (ii) introducing randomness and anonymity into the architecture, making it difficult for an attacker to target nodes along the path to a specific SOS-protected destination.Using simple analytical models, we evaluate the likelihood that an attacker can successfully launch a DoS attack against an SOS-protected network. Our analysis demonstrates that such an architecture reduces the likelihood of a successful attack to minuscule levels.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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CITED BY  71

Collaborative Colleagues:
Angelos D. Keromytis: colleagues
Vishal Misra: colleagues
Dan Rubenstein: colleagues