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Founding crytpography on oblivious transfer
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Source Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing archive
Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing table of contents
Chicago, Illinois, United States
Pages: 20 - 31  
Year of Publication: 1988
ISBN:0-89791-264-0
Author
Joe Kilian  MIT
Sponsor
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 20,   Downloads (12 Months): 143,   Citation Count: 31
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ABSTRACT

Suppose your netmail is being erratically censored by Captain Yossarian. Whenever you send a message, he censors each bit of the message with probability 1/2, replacing each censored bit by some reserved character. Well versed in such concepts as redundancy, this is no real problem to you. The question is, can it actually be turned around and used to your advantage? We answer this question strongly in the affirmative. We show that this protocol, more commonly known as oblivious transfer, can be used to simulate a more sophisticated protocol, known as oblivious circuit evaluation([Y]). We also show that with such a communication channel, one can have completely noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs of statements in NP. These results do not use any complexity-theoretic assumptions. We can show that they have applications to a variety of models in which oblivious transfer can be done.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
AF
Abadi, Martin, Joan Feigenbaum, "A Simple and Efficient Protocol for Secure Circuit Computation,'' to appear.
 
AL
Angluin, Dana and David Lichtenstein. "Provable Security of Cryptosystems: a Survey," YALEU/DCS/TR-288, 1983.
B
 
BC
Brassard, Gilles and Claude Cr~peau. "Zero-Knowledge Simulation of Boolean Circuits,'' Proceedings of the 27th FOCS, IEEE, 1986, 188-195.
BGKW
 
BHZ
 
C
Cripeau Claude, "On the Equivalence of Two Types of Oblivious Transfer", Crypto87.
 
CCD
D. Chaum, C. Crdpeau and I. Damgard, Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols, These proceedings.
 
CDG
EGL
For
 
FRS
Fortnow, Lance, Mike Sipser, John Rompel, "On the Power of Multi-Prover Interactive Proof Systems," to appear.
 
GHY
Galil Z., Haber S., and Yung M., "A Prirate Interactive Test of ~ Boolean Predicate and Minimum-Knowledge Public-Key Cryptosystem", Proceedings of the ~6th FOGS, 1985, pp. 360-371.
GMR
 
GMW1
Goldreich, Oded, Silvio Micali, and A- vi Wigderson. "Proofs that Yield Nothing but the Validity of the Assertion, and a Methodology of Cryptographic Protocol Design," Proceedings of the 27th FOGS, IEEE, 1986, 174-187.
GMW2
 
GV
 
M
Micali, Silvio, Personal Communication.
 
R
Rabin, M., "How to exchange secrets by oblivious transfer", Tech. Memo TR-81, Aiken Computation Laboratory, Harvard University, 1981.
 
Y
Yao, Andrew C. "How to Generate and Exchange Secrets," Proceedings of the 27th FOGS, IEEE, 1986, 162-167.

CITED BY  31