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Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
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Source Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing archive
Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing table of contents
Chicago, Illinois, United States
Pages: 11 - 19  
Year of Publication: 1988
ISBN:0-89791-264-0
Authors
David Chaum  Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science (C.W.I.), Kruislaan 413, 1098 SJ Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Claude Crépeau  Laboratory for Computer Science, M.I.T., 545 Technology Square, Cambridge, MA, U.S.A.
Ivan Damgard  Mathematisk Institut, Aarhus Universitet, Ny Munkegade, DK 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
Sponsor
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 24,   Downloads (12 Months): 197,   Citation Count: 105
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ABSTRACT

Under the assumption that each pair of participants can communicate secretly, we show that any reasonable multiparty protocol can be achieved if at least 2n/3 of the participants are honest. The secrecy achieved is unconditional. It does not rely on any assumption about computational intractability.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
BF
 
Be
Benaloh: Secret sharing homomorphisms, Proc. of Crypto 86.
 
Bl
Blakely: Security proofs for information protection systems. Proc~ngs of the 1980 Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE Computer Society Press, NY, 1981, pp.79-88.
 
BC
 
BCC
Brassard, Chaum and Cr6peau: Minimum Disclosure Proofs of knowledge. To appear.
BGW
 
Ch
Chaum: How to keep a sex:ret alive. PrOngs of Crypto 84.
 
Ch2
Chaum: The Dining Cryptographers Problem, to appe~.
 
CDG
 
CGMA
Chor, Goldwasser, Micali and Awerbuch: Verifiable Secret Sharing and Achieving Simultaneity in the Presence of faults. ProceeAings of FOCS 85, pp.383-395.
DS
GMW
LPS
MS
Sh
 
Ya
Yao: Protocols for secure computations, Proc. of FOCS 82, pp. 160-164.

CITED BY  105

Collaborative Colleagues:
David Chaum: colleagues
Claude Crépeau: colleagues
Ivan Damgard: colleagues