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Mondrian memory protection
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Source Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems archive
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems table of contents
San Jose, California
SESSION: Coordinating memory table of contents
Pages: 304 - 316  
Year of Publication: 2002
ISBN:1-58113-574-2
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Authors
Emmett Witchel  MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA
Josh Cates  MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA
Krste Asanović  MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA
Sponsors
SIGPLAN: ACM Special Interest Group on Programming Languages
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
SIGARCH: ACM Special Interest Group on Computer Architecture
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 6,   Downloads (12 Months): 90,   Citation Count: 46
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ABSTRACT

Mondrian memory protection (MMP) is a fine-grained protection scheme that allows multiple protection domains to flexibly share memory and export protected services. In contrast to earlier page-based systems, MMP allows arbitrary permissions control at the granularity of individual words. We use a compressed permissions table to reduce space overheads and employ two levels of permissions caching to reduce run-time overheads. The protection tables in our implementation add less than 9% overhead to the memory space used by the application. Accessing the protection tables adds than 8% additional memory references to the accesses made by the application. Although it can be layered on top of demand-paged virtual memory, MMP is also well-suited to embedded systems with a single physical address space. We extend MMP to support segment translation which allows a memory segment to appear at another location in the address space. We use this translation to implement zero-copy networking underneath the standard read system call interface, where packet payload fragments are connected together by the translation system to avoid data copying. This saves 52% of the memory references used by a traditional copying network stack.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  46
Collaborative Colleagues:
Emmett Witchel: colleagues
Josh Cates: colleagues
Krste Asanović: colleagues