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ABSTRACT
Unlike signature or misuse based intrusion detection techniques, anomaly detection is capable of detecting novel attacks. However, the use of anomaly detection in practice is hampered by a high rate of false alarms. Specification-based techniques have been shown to produce a low rate of false alarms, but are not as effective as anomaly detection in detecting novel attacks, especially when it comes to network probing and denial-of-service attacks. This paper presents a new approach that combines specification-based and anomaly-based intrusion detection, mitigating the weaknesses of the two approaches while magnifying their strengths. Our approach begins with state-machine specifications of network protocols, and augments these state machines with information about statistics that need to be maintained to detect anomalies. We present a specification language in which all of this information can be captured in a succinct manner. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach on the 1999 Lincoln Labs intrusion detection evaluation data, where we are able to detect all of the probing and denial-of-service attacks with a low rate of false alarms (less than 10 per day). Whereas feature selection was a crucial step that required a great deal of expertise and insight in the case of previous anomaly detection approaches, we show that the use of protocol specifications in our approach simplifies this problem. Moreover, the machine learning component of our approach is robust enough to operate without human supervision, and fast enough that no sampling techniques need to be employed. As further evidence of effectiveness, we present results of applying our approach to detect stealthy email viruses in an intranet environment.
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Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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