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Mimicry attacks on host-based intrusion detection systems
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Washington, DC, USA
SESSION: Intrusion detection table of contents
Pages: 255 - 264  
Year of Publication: 2002
ISBN:1-58113-612-9
Authors
David Wagner  University of California, Berkeley, CA
Paolo Soto  University of California, Berkeley, CA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 37,   Downloads (12 Months): 259,   Citation Count: 38
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ABSTRACT

We examine several host-based anomaly detection systems and study their security against evasion attacks. First, we introduce the notion of a mimicry attack, which allows a sophisticated attacker to cloak their intrusion to avoid detection by the IDS. Then, we develop a theoretical framework for evaluating the security of an IDS against mimicry attacks. We show how to break the security of one published IDS with these methods, and we experimentally confirm the power of mimicry attacks by giving a worked example of an attack on a concrete IDS implementation. We conclude with a call for further research on intrusion detection from both attacker's and defender's viewpoints.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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K.M.C. Tan, K.S. Killourhy, R.A. Maxion, "Undermining an Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection System Using Common Exploits," to appear at RAID 2002, 16--18 Oct. 2002.
 
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CITED BY  38

Collaborative Colleagues:
David Wagner: colleagues
Paolo Soto: colleagues