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MOPS: an infrastructure for examining security properties of software
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Washington, DC, USA
SESSION: Analysis and verification table of contents
Pages: 235 - 244  
Year of Publication: 2002
ISBN:1-58113-612-9
Authors
Hao Chen  University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA
David Wagner  University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 11,   Downloads (12 Months): 102,   Citation Count: 72
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ABSTRACT

We describe a formal approach for finding bugs in security-relevant software and verifying their absence. The idea is as follows: we identify rules of safe programming practice, encode them as safety properties, and verify whether these properties are obeyed. Because manual verification is too expensive, we have built a program analysis tool to automate this process. Our program analysis models the program to be verified as a pushdown automaton, represents the security property as a finite state automaton, and uses model checking techniques to identify whether any state violating the desired security goal is reachable in the program. The major advantages of this approach are that it is sound in verifying the absence of certain classes of vulnerabilities, that it is fully interprocedural, and that it is efficient and scalable. Experience suggests that this approach will be useful in finding a wide range of security vulnerabilities in large programs efficiently.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  72