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Authenticated-encryption with associated-data
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Washington, DC, USA
SESSION: Crytography table of contents
Pages: 98 - 107  
Year of Publication: 2002
ISBN:1-58113-612-9
Author
Phillip Rogaway  Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

When a message is transformed into a ciphertext in a way designed to protect both its privacy and authenticity, there may be additional information, such as a packet header, that travels alongside the ciphertext (at least conceptually) and must get authenticated with it. We formalize and investigate this authenticated-encryption with associated-data (AEAD) problem. Though the problem has long been addressed in cryptographic practice, it was never provided a definition or even a name. We do this, and go on to look at efficient solutions for AEAD, both in general and for the authenticated-encryption scheme OCB. For the general setting we study two simple ways to turn an authenticated-encryption scheme that does not support associated-data into one that does: nonce stealing and ciphertext translation. For the case of OCB we construct an AEAD-scheme by combining OCB and the pseudorandom function PMAC, using the same key for both algorithms. We prove that, despite "interaction" between the two schemes when using a common key, the combination is sound. We also consider achieving AEAD by the generic composition of a nonce-based, privacy-only encryption scheme and a pseudorandom function.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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P. Rogaway. Authenticated-encryption with associated-data. Full version of this paper. Available from www.cs.ucdavis.edu/rogaway
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