Design and implementation of the idemix anonymous credential system

ABSTRACT

Anonymous credential systems [8, 9, 12, 24] allow anonymous yet authenticated and accountable transactions between users and service providers. As such, they represent a powerful technique for protecting users' privacy when conducting Internet transactions. In this paper, we describe the design and implementation of an anonymous credential system based on the protocols developed by [6]. The system is based on new high-level primitives and interfaces allowing for easy integration into access control systems. The prototype was realized in Java. We demonstrate its use and some deployment issues with the description of an operational demonstration scenario.

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INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  E. Data
  E.3 DATA ENCRYPTION
      Subjects: Public key cryptosystems

General Terms:
Design, Security

Keywords:
anonymous credential systems, cryptographic protocols, privacy