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Detectable byzantine agreement secure against faulty majorities
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Source Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing archive
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing table of contents
Monterey, California
SESSION: Session 3 table of contents
Pages: 118 - 126  
Year of Publication: 2002
ISBN:1-58113-485-1
Authors
Matthias Fitzi  ETH Zurich Switzerland
Daniel Gottesman  UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA
Martin Hirt  ETH Zurich, Switzerland
Thomas Holenstein  ETH Zurich, Switzerland
Adam Smith  M.I.T. Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA
Sponsors
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

It is well-known that n players, connected only by pairwise secure channels, can achieve Byzantine agreement only if the number t of cheaters satisfies t < n/3, even with respect to computational security. However, for many applications it is sufficient to achieve detectable broadcast. With this primitive, broadcast is only guaranteed when all players are non-faulty ("honest"), but all non-faulty players always reach agreement on whether broadcast was achieved or not. We show that detectable broadcast can be achieved regardless of the number of faulty players (i.e., for all t < n). We give a protocol which is unconditionally secure, as well as two more efficient protocols which are secure with respect to computational assumptions, and the existence of quantum channels, respectively.These protocols allow for secure multi-party computation tolerating any t < n, assuming only pairwise authenticated channels. Moreover, they allow for the setup of public-key infrastructures that are consistent among all participants --- using neither a trusted party nor broadcast channels.Finally, we show that it is not even necessary for players to begin the protocol at the same time step. We give a "detectable Firing Squad" protocol which can be initiated by a single user at any time and such that either all honest players end up with synchronized clocks, or all honest players abort.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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H. Barnum, C. Crépeau, D. Gottesman, A. Smith, and A. Tapp. Authentication of quantum messages. Manuscript, 2001.
 
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S. Goldwasser and Y. Lindell. Secure computation without a broadcast channel. http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/040.ps, Apr. 2002.
 
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D. Gottesman and I. Chuang. Quantum digital signatures. Manuscript, 2001.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Matthias Fitzi: colleagues
Daniel Gottesman: colleagues
Martin Hirt: colleagues
Thomas Holenstein: colleagues
Adam Smith: colleagues