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Building secure file systems out of byzantine storage
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Source Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing archive
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing table of contents
Monterey, California
SESSION: Session 3 table of contents
Pages: 108 - 117  
Year of Publication: 2002
ISBN:1-58113-485-1
Authors
David Mazières  NYU Department of Computer Science
Dennis Shasha  NYU Department of Computer Science
Sponsors
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 12,   Downloads (12 Months): 57,   Citation Count: 17
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ABSTRACT

This paper shows how to implement a trusted network file system on an untrusted server. While cryptographic storage techniques exist that allow users to keep data secret from untrusted servers, this work concentrates on the detection of tampering attacks and stale data. Ideally, users of an untrusted storage server would immediately and unconditionally notice any misbehavior on the part of the server. This ideal is unfortunately not achievable. However, we define a notion of data integrity called fork consistency in which, if the server delays just one user from seeing even a single change by another, the two users will never again see one another's changes---a failure easily detectable with on-line communication. We give a practical protocol for a multi-user network file system called SUNDR, and prove that SUNDR offers fork consistency whether or not the server obeys the protocol.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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David Bindel, Yan Chen, Patrick Eaton, Dennis Geels, Ramakrishna Gummadi, Sean Rhea, Hakim Weatherspoon, Westley Weimer, Westley Weimer, Christopher Wells, Ben Zhao, and John Kubiatowicz. Oceanstore: An exteremely wide-area storage system. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, pages 190-201, 2000.
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Dan Duchamp. A toolkit approach to partially disconnected operation. In Proceedings of the 1997 USENIX, pages 305-318. USENIX, January 1997.
 
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Kevin Fu. Group sharing and random access in cryptographic storage file systems. Master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 1999.
 
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Kevin Fu, M. Frans Kaashoek, and David Mazières. Fast and secure distributed read-only file system. In Proceedings of the 4th Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, 2000.
 
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Umesh Maheshwari and Radek Vingralek. How to build a trusted database system on untrusted storage. In Proceedings of the 4th Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, San Diego, October 2000.
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David Mazières and Dennis Shasha. Building secure file systems out of byzantine storage. Technical Report TR2002-826, NYU Department of Computer Science, May 2002.
 
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Ethan Miller, Darrell Long, William Freeman, and Benjamin Reed. Strong security for distributed file systems. In Proceedings of the 20th IEEE International Performance, Computing, and Communications Conference, pages 34-40, Phoenix, AZ, April 2001.
 
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David Reed and Liba Svobodova. Swallow: A distributed data storage system for a local network. In A. West and P. Janson, editors, Local Networks for Computer Communications, pages 355-373. North-Holland Publ., Amsterdam, 1981.
 
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CITED BY  17
Collaborative Colleagues:
David Mazières: colleagues
Dennis Shasha: colleagues