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Paradoxes in distributed decisions on optimal load balancing for networks of homogeneous computers
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Volume 49 ,  Issue 3  (May 2002) table of contents
Pages: 407 - 433  
Year of Publication: 2002
ISSN:0004-5411
Authors
Hisao Kameda  University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan
Odile Pourtallier  INRIA, Sophia-Antipolis, France
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In completely symmetric systems that have homogeneous nodes (hosts, computers, or processors) with identical arrival processes, an optimal static load balancing scheme does not involve the forwarding of jobs among nodes. Using an appropriate analytic model of a distributed computer system, we examine the following three decision schemes for load balancing: completely distributed, intermediately distributed, and completely centralized. We show that there is no forwarding of jobs in the completely centralized and completely distributed schemes, but that in an intermediately distributed decision scheme, mutual forwarding of jobs among nodes is possible, leading to degradation in system performance for every decision maker. This result appears paradoxical, because by adding communication capacity to the system for the sharing of jobs between nodes, the overall system performance is degraded. We characterize conditions under which such paradoxical behavior occurs, and we give examples in which the degradation of performance may increase without bound. We show that the degradation reduces and finally disappears in the limit as the intermediately distributed decision scheme tends to a completely distributed one.


REFERENCES

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Hisao Kameda: colleagues
Odile Pourtallier: colleagues