Decision procedures for multiple auctions

ABSTRACT

This paper presents a decision theoretic framework that an autonomous agent can use to bid effectively across multiple, simultaneous auctions. Specifically, our framework enables an agent to make rational decisions about purchasing multiple goods from a series of auctions that operate different protocols (we deal with the English, Dutch, First-Price Sealed Bid and Vickrey cases). The framework is then used to characterize the optimal decision that an agent should take. Finally, we develop a practical algorithm that provides a heuristic approximation to this ideal.

REFERENCES

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INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  I. Computing Methodologies
  I.2 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Additional Classification:
  F. Theory of Computation
  F.2 ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHMS AND PROBLEM COMPLEXITY

  G. Mathematics of Computing
  G.2 DISCRETE MATHEMATICS

General Terms:
Algorithms, Design, Economics