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Bidders with hard valuation problems
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Source International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1 table of contents
Bologna, Italy
SESSION: Session 1B: bidding and bargaining agents I table of contents
Pages: 160 - 161  
Year of Publication: 2002
ISBN:1-58113-480-0
Authors
Kate Larson  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
Tuomas Sandholm  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
Sponsors
SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Auctions provide efficient and distributed ways of allocating goods and tasks among agents. In this paper we study optimal strategies for computationally limited agents, where agents must use their limited computing resources to determine valuations for (bundles of) the items being auctioned. Agents are free to compute on any valuation problems including their opponents'. The deliberation actions are incorporated into the agents' strategies and different auction settings (both single--item and combinatorial) are analyzed in order to determine equilibrium strategies. We show that in some auction mechanisms, but not others, in equilibrium the bidders compute on others' problems as well. We show that the model of bounded rationality (limited or costly computing) impacts the agents' equilibrium strategies and so must be considered when designing mechanisms for computationally limited agents.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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P. Milgrom. Auctions and bidding: A primer. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(3):3--22, 1989.
 
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D. C. Parkes. Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation problems. In Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce Workshop at IJCAI99, Stockholm, Sweden, 1999.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Kate Larson: colleagues
Tuomas Sandholm: colleagues