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Protecting electronic commerce from distributed denial-of-service attacks
Full text PdfPdf (134 KB)
Source International World Wide Web Conference archive
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on World Wide Web table of contents
Honolulu, Hawaii, USA
SESSION: Advertising and Security for E-Commerence table of contents
Pages: 553 - 561  
Year of Publication: 2002
ISBN:1-58113-449-5
Author
José Brustoloni  Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technologies, Holmdel, NJ
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
: WWW'02
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

It is widely recognized that distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks can disrupt electronic commerce and cause large revenue losses. However, effective defenses continue to be mostly unavailable. We describe and evaluate VIPnet, a novel value-added network service for protecting e-commerce and other transaction-based sites from DDoS attacks. In VIPnet, e-merchants pay Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to carry the packets of the e-merchants' best clients (called VIPs) in a privileged class of service (CoS), protected from congestion, whether malicious or not, in the regular CoS. VIPnet rewards VIPs with not only better quality of service, but also greater availability. Because VIP rights are client- and server-specific, cannot be forged, are usage-limited, and are only replenished after successful client transactions (e.g., purchases), it is impractical for attackers to mount and sustain DDoS attacks against an e-merchant's VIPs. VIPnet can be deployed incrementally and does not require universal adoption. Experiments demonstrate VIPnet's benefits.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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