| Paid placement strategies for internet search engines |
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International World Wide Web Conference
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Proceedings of the 11th international conference on World Wide Web
table of contents
Honolulu, Hawaii, USA
SESSION: Auctions and E-commerce
table of contents
Pages: 117 - 123
Year of Publication: 2002
ISBN:1-58113-449-5
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 17, Downloads (12 Months): 119, Citation Count: 4
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ABSTRACT
Internet search engines and comparison shopping have recently begun implementing a paid placement strategy, where some content providers are given prominent positioning in return for a placement fee. This bias generates placement revenues but creates a disutility to users, thus reducing user-based revenues. We formulate the search engine design problem as a tradeoff between these two types of revenues. We demonstrate that the optimal placement strategy depends on the relative benefits (to providers) and disutilities (to users) of paid placement. We compute the optimal placement fee, characterize the optimal bias level, and analyze sensitivity of the placement strategy to various factors. In the optimal paid placement strategy, the placement revenues are set below the monopoly level due to its negative impact on advertising revenues. An increase in the search engine's quality of service allows it to improve profits from paid placement, moving it closer to the ideal. However, an increase in the value-per-user motivates the gatekeeper to increase market share by reducing further its reliance on paid placement and fraction of paying providers.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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CITED BY 4
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Scott Nicholson , Tito Sierra , U. Yeliz Eseryel , Ji-Hong Park , Philip Barkow , Erika J. Pozo , Jane Ward, How much of it is real? Analysis of paid placement in Web search engine results, Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, v.57 n.4, p.448-461, February 2006
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