| The invasiveness of off-line memory checking |
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Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
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Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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Montreal, Quebec, Canada
SESSION: Session 8B
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Pages: 504 - 513
Year of Publication: 2002
ISBN:1-58113-495-9
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 3, Downloads (12 Months): 14, Citation Count: 2
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ABSTRACT
Memory checking is the task of checking the correctness of a sequence of "store" and "retrieve" operations. The operations are performed in a large unreliable memory. A checker using a much smaller but completely reliable memory tries to decide whether they were executed correctly. M. Blum, W. Evans, P. Gemmel, S. Kannan and M. Naor, has shown in 1991 that the off-line checking of a sequence of memory operations concerning a RAM consisting of n registers can be done, in a probabilistic sense, by a checker using only O(log n) reliable memory and a constant number of RAM operation per each "store" and "retrieve" operations (with log n word length), moreover no unproven cryptographic assumptions are needed in the proof. The probability of error will be polynomially small in n. The solution however requires the checker to store some extra information in the unreliable memory, that is, the checking protocol is invasive. (In this solution the time of each "store" operation must be stored together with the data and must be supplied to the checker at the time of the corresponding retrieve operation.) In this paper we prove that off-line memory checking, in the sense described above, is necessarily invasive, even if we make the problem somewhat easier for the checker to exclude trivial counter-examples. We show that even if the checker is allowed to read a constant number of registers from the large memory after each "store" or "retrieve" instruction, off-line non-invasive memory checking is not possible. Moreover for the case when the invasiveness consists of storing some extra information together with each piece of data and retrieving it together with the data we give a quantitative lower bound on the amount of extra "invasive" information stored in the memory. Namely, if the checker has O(log n) memory and the probability of error is polynomially small than the "invasiveness" of the mentioned method of [5] is optimal upto a constant factor. With other words the total number of extra bits that must be written in the memory is at least &egr;T log T, where T is the number of store and retrieve operations. In the lower bounds we do not restrict the computational power of the checker at all, in fact we only assume that the checker is an n-way branching program with O(log n) bits of memory.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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S. Arora, C. Lund, R. Motwani, M. Sudan, and M. Szegedy. Proof verification and intractability of approximation problems. In Proc. 33rd IEEE Symp. on Foundation of Computer Science, pages 13--22, 1992.
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S. Arora and S. Safra. Probabilistic checking of proofs. a new characterization of np. In Proc. 33rd IEEE Symp. on Foundation of Computer Science, pages 2--12, 1992.
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Manuel Blum , Will Evans , Peter Gemmell , Sampath Kannan , Moni Naor, Checking the correctness of memories, Proceedings of the 32nd annual symposium on Foundations of computer science, p.90-99, September 1991, San Juan, Puerto Rico
[doi> 10.1109/SFCS.1991.185352]
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M. Fischlin. Incremental cryptography and memory checkers. In Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt '97, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1233, pages 393--408. Springer-Verlag, 1997.
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