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ABSTRACT
We prove complexity, approximability, and inapproximability results for the problem of finding an exchange equilibrium in markets with indivisible (integer) goods, most notably a polynomial-time algorithm that approximates the market equilibrium arbitrarily closely when the number of goods is bounded and the utilities are linear. We also show a communication complexity lower bound, implying that the ideal informational economy of a market with unique individual optima is unattainable in general.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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CITED BY 27
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R. J. Lipton , E. Markakis , E. Mossel , A. Saberi, On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods, Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, May 17-20, 2004, New York, NY, USA
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Erik D. Demaine , Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi , Uriel Feige , Mohammad R. Salavatipour, Combination can be hard: approximability of the unique coverage problem, Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm, p.162-171, January 22-26, 2006, Miami, Florida
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Venkatesan Guruswami , Jason D. Hartline , Anna R. Karlin , David Kempe , Claire Kenyon , Frank McSherry, On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing, Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, January 23-25, 2005, Vancouver, British Columbia
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Bruno Codenotti , Amin Saberi , Kasturi Varadarajan , Yinyu Ye, Leontief economies encode nonzero sum two-player games, Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm, p.659-667, January 22-26, 2006, Miami, Florida
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