Differences between the iterated prisoner's dilemma and the chicken game under noisy conditions

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Differences between the iterated prisoner's dilemma and the chicken game under noisy conditions

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Symposium on Applied Computing archive
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM symposium on Applied computing table of contents

Madrid, Spain

SESSION: Agents, interactions, mobility and systems table of contents

Pages: 42 - 48

Year of Publication: 2002

ISBN:1-58113-445-2

Authors

Bengt Carlsson	Blekinge Institute of Technology, S-372 25 Ronneby, Sweden
K. Ingemar Jönsson	Lund University, Ecology Building, S-223 62 Lund, Sweden

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SIGAPP: ACM Special Interest Group on Applied Computing

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

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ABSTRACT

The prisoner's dilemma has evolved into a standard game for analyzing the success of cooperative strategies in repeated games. With the aim of investigating the behavior of strategies in some alternative games we analyzed the outcome of iterated games for both the prisoner's dilemma and the chicken game. In the chicken game, mutual defection is punished more strongly than in the prisoner's dilemma, and yields the lowest fitness. We also ran our analyses under different levels of noise. The results reveal a striking difference in the outcome between the games. Iterated chicken game needed more generations to find a winning strategy. It also favored nice, forgiving strategies able to forgive a defection from an opponent. In particular the well-known strategy tit-for-tat has a poor successrate under noisy conditions. The chicken game conditions may be relatively common in other sciences, and therefore we suggest that this game should receive more interest as a cooperative game from researchers within computer science.

REFERENCES

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